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Charles T.  Clotfelter and Michael Rothschild 
Higher education in the United States is an enterprise of large proportions and 
far-reaching effects. There are today some 3,400 separately governed colleges 
and universities, ranging in size from colleges with a few hundred students to 
giant state universities enrolling tens of thousands. In 1990 these institutions 
together enrolled 14.2 million students and made expenditures amounting to 
2.8 percent of  gross national product (Clotfelter et al. 1991, 3; U.S. Depart- 
ment of Education  1991a, table 29; 1991b, table 1). At current rates of edu- 
cational attainment, more than a quarter of all adults will have completed four 
years of college by middle age (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1990, table 217). 
Higher education not only affects the overall level of productivity in the econ- 
omy but also is a major factor in determining the distribution of income.’ It 
also has widespread effects through the research undertaken at universities, 
although those effects are difficult to quantify. 
One distinctive feature of higher education in this country is the existence 
of  a sizable private nonprofit sector. In this sector are some of  the country’s 
most prominent colleges and universities. But the public sector, in the form of 
community  colleges and  state-supported colleges and universities,  remains 
larger than the private and in fact constitutes one of the most important activ- 
ities of state government, providing service functions to agriculture, industry, 
and local governments, in addition to research and teaching functions. Rela- 
tive to other industries of  comparable size, higher education has distinctive 
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features. Among them are the high degree of autonomy accorded to one group 
of employees-the  faculty-and  their nonhierarchical organization. 
As a subject of economic analysis, higher education is certainly not unex- 
plored territory. Despite the inherent difficulties in attempting to undertake 
objective analysis of one’s own industry, a significant number of economists 
have devoted scholarly attention to colleges and universities. For example, 
economists have used the human capital model to examine such topics as the 
decisions of individuals to undertake the investment in college and the impact 
of college training on their subsequent earnings. There has also been consid- 
erable attention to policy issues related to student demand, such as the impact 
of tuition levels and scholarship programs on the number and composition of 
students entering college.  A  second major component of  the literature on 
higher education has been supplied by  labor economists, who have applied 
their tools of  analysis to the academic job market. In  addition, economists 
have examined a variety of other topics, such as research expenditures, pro- 
ductivity, and implications of public subsidies to state  institution^.^ 
Despite the advances made by  this research, the trends and debates of the 
last decade make it clear that there is much about the higher education indus- 
try that we still do not know. Although a decade of growth for higher educa- 
tion, the 1980s were also a period in which problems and criticisms became 
more prominent. Colleges and universities consistently raised their tuitions 
faster than inflation, prompting critics to call them “greedy” and inefficient 
(see, e.g., Bennett 1987, A31; Washington  Post Weekly 1989; Finn 1984,29- 
33, 47-51).  Between 1979 and 1987, for example, tuition and fees increased 
in real terms at an average rate of 3.0 percent a year in public institutions and 
4.9 percent a year in private  institution^.^ Combined with reductions in federal 
funding for student aid grants, these increases raised concerns about the abil- 
ity of low- and middle-income students to afford to attend college. One aspect 
of  the existing financial aid system that came under special scrutiny was the 
practice, by several groups of selective private institutions, of comparing and 
adjusting the financial aid offers made to individual students. Defended as a 
means to take financial considerations out of college choice, this practice was 
investigated by the Justice Department as a possible antitrust violation. More 
generally, there were increasing signs that colleges were using marketing tech- 
niques and non-need-based  scholarships often to attract top applicants. The 
academic job market also presented new challenges. One study (Bowen and 
Sosa 1989) predicted that during the period  1997 to 2002, shortages of  arts 
and sciences faculty could develop on the order of 40 percent. After a decade 
of  slack demand for Ph.D.’s in many fields, some questioned whether gradu- 
2. For a discussion of the internal organization of  universities, see Coleman (1973). 
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ate programs would attract the number and quality of applicants necessary to 
sustain research and graduate education at previous levels. 
When confronted with issues such as these, economists see questions not 
unlike those that arise in the study of other industries in the economy. In par- 
ticular, economists have tended to ask two basic questions about higher edu- 
cation: What mix of products does the higher education industry produce, and 
at what cost? Who pays for these products, and who benefits from them? The 
eight studies in this volume are no exception. Although most of them examine 
topics that have received  relatively  little attention to date, the studies pre- 
sented here are concerned with these two basic issues.  Two of the studies 
focus primarily on the first question. Rothschild and White examine the nature 
of competition in the higher education industry. Merton’s chapter is an analy- 
sis of how universities ought to manage their endowments, which is nothing 
more  than  using  resources  efficiently. Successful endowment  management 
should reduce costs. Five studies (those by Manski, Hauser, Cook and Frank, 
Green, and Ehrenberg, Brewer, and Rees) address different aspects of  who 
chooses to purchase what kind of education and why. The chapter by Quigley 
and Rubinfeld addresses both questions as it attempts to explain why in some 
states taxpayers pay for extensive (and expensive) systems of higher education 
while in others the variety and quality of state-subsidized higher education is 
more limited. A brief overview of these studies reveals the economic content 
in the issues they raise. 
In the first chapter of  this volume, Michael Rothschild and Lawrence White 
look at how individual institutions operate within a larger marketplace.  Al- 
though it should not be surprising that economists looking at higher education 
might view colleges and universities in much the same way as they view firms 
in other industries, there has in fact been little research with this kind of mar- 
ket orientation. But colleges and universities clearly do compete in a market- 
place, as was recognized many years ago by University of  Chicago president 
Robert Maynard Hutchins, who commented on the emphasis in college adver- 
tising on the beauty of campuses and the availability of recreational opportu- 
nities (1936, 29). And the issue of competition has, of course, recently taken 
on added policy importance in light of the Justice Department’s investigation 
into the financial aid practices of several groups of private institutions, noted 
above. Considered from a global perspective, one of the most unusual features 
of higher education in the United States is the amount of competition between 
different institutions. A strong and variegated private sector exists alongside 
many different public  systems. These institutions  compete for faculty, stu- 
dents, research grants, contributions, and access to the public purse.  Some 
observers, such as Rosovsky (1990), attribute the vitality of U.S. higher edu- 
cation to its competitive nature. Yet very little work has been done analyzing 
how competition works in the higher education industry. 
White and Rothschild note several puzzles regarding the behavior of U.S. 
colleges and  universities.  One is  that  institutions  with  small  endowments 4  Charles T. Clotfelter and Michael Rothschild 
compete successfully (at least in the sense of survival) with institutions whose 
per student endowments exceed theirs by a hundredfold and more. This obser- 
vation raises obvious and interesting questions about the nature of competition 
in the higher education industry. Other puzzles include the near-uniformity of 
tuition charges despite clear distinctions in prestige  and the apparent resist- 
ance to charging revenue-maximizing rates. Questions such as these motivate 
the Rothschild and White paper,  which  looks at how individual  institutions 
operate within a larger labor market. One explanation for below-market tui- 
tion charges is that it enables institutions to be choosy about  what kind of 
students to accept; where there are externalities among different kinds of stu- 
dents, this may be efficient. The authors also consider the argument that uni- 
versities use undergraduate education to subsidize research. Using a “stand- 
alone test,” they reject this notion because of the clear fact that universities are 
able to compete in the market for undergraduate education with colleges that 
produce only that service. In his comment on the paper, Martin Feldstein sug- 
gests that  some of the puzzles raised by  Rothschild  and White can be ex- 
plained by the set of incentives facing university administrators. Because of 
the nonprofit nature of these institutions, he argues, there is little to gain and 
much to suffer from undertaking unpopular but potentially beneficial changes. 
At the heart of the economic model of enrollment demand is the assumption 
that potential college students have a way of assessing the future increase in 
earnings that would result from attending college. Indeed, one likely expla- 
nation  for the continued growth in college enrollments during the  1980s, a 
period in which the number of 18-year-olds was falling, is the strong rebound 
during the decade in the earnings advantage enjoyed by college graduates over 
high school graduates. Although this differential fell during the 1970s, it rose 
smartly after 1979. For example, the gap in average full-time earnings of male 
high  school and college graduates  fell from 42 percent  in  1970 to 29 per- 
cent in  1979 but then jumped back to 50 percent  by  1987 (Clotfelter et al. 
1991, 65). 
How are young people-especially  those from lower incomes who know 
fewer college students and graduates-expected  to gather and evaluate infor- 
mation  on the economic  return  to college? This is the beginning point  for 
Charles Manski’s chapter. Manski works through a simple model of  educa- 
tional choice to illustrate the difficulty of processing information of this sort. 
He supposes that youths differ both in their abilities-the  extent to which their 
incomes will increase if  they go to school-and  in their taste for schooling. 
He supposes that youths choose to attend college if they believe that college 
attendance will increase lifetime well-being, including both the effect of col- 
lege on income and the actual utility (or disutility) of attending college. 
Expectations of the effect of college attendance on future income play a key 
role in this  model.  Manski considers  two alternatives.  In each case, youth 
look to the actual experience of the generation  that attended  college before 
them. In one, youth  are presumed to have information about  the ability  of 5  Introduction 
their elders and thus to know the relationship between ability, education, and 
income. In the other case, youth do not know the abilities of their elders and 
assume that all who go to college have the same expected income. The two 
assumptions about expectations yield two different equilibria; the differences 
are illuminating. For example,  the average ability of  the college-bound is 
higher in the first model than in the second. Manski goes on to consider how 
an econometrician, ignorant of the actual mechanism used to generate expec- 
tations but armed with the conventional faith in rational expectations and the 
conventional lack of  concern for unmeasured variables (in this case, a taste 
for education)-would  analyze the data produced by  such models. Not  sur- 
prisingly, the hypothetical econometrician would fail to grasp the mechanism 
which generates the returns to schooling and the determination of the decision 
to enroll in college. Manski concludes that the only way out of  this kind of 
dilemma is to study explicitly the mechanism youth use to form expectations 
about schooling. He argues that economists must measure and use subjective 
variables in their studies of the enrollment decisions and returns to schooling. 
In his comment on this paper, Eric Hanushek expresses skepticism about the 
likelihood of  economists being able to  do this and argues that economists 
using and refining conventional tools can make progress in analyzing the role 
and effects of expectations. Recent large changes in the apparent returns to 
education provide a rich opportunity for this kind of analysis. 
Despite the overall increase in  rates of  college enrollment in  the United 
States in recent decades, considerable concern has been expressed about the 
rates for minority groups. One statistic that has gained attention is the decline 
in one measure of  the college enrollment rate for black and Hispanic high 
school graduates since the mid-1970s. There is  also evidence that college 
completion rates among blacks have declined markedly from the early 1970s 
to the mid-1980s. A related trend is a growing gap in enrollment rates between 
children in families in the top quintile of incomes and other college-age youth. 
Robert Hauser uses data from the annual Current Population Surveys from 
1972 to 1988 to examine trends in college enrollment of young people, with 
special attention to differences by race and ethnicity. He estimated equations 
explaining college entry over this period and found that the difference in rates 
between blacks and whites can be explained by  differences in social back- 
ground. Compared to  those  of  other racial and  ethnic groups, white high 
school graduates come from families that have fewer children, are more likely 
to own their own house, and have parents who are better educated and have 
higher status jobs.  Holding social background constant, Hauser shows that 
college entry rates of blacks actually have remained above those of whites. In 
their comment on this paper, Steven Cameron and James Heckman question 
some of Hauser’s conclusions. They argue that the census data Hauser uses 
are not sufficiently rich to permit a complete analysis of the determinants of 
college entry. Their own work (Cameron and Heckman 1992) using a data set 
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particular,  family  income-suggests  that  differences  in  college  attendance 
among racial groups cannot be attributed solely to differences in backgrounds. 
In their chapter, Philip Cook and Robert Frank focus on another aspect of 
undergraduate enrollment patterns: where do the best students go? Among the 
vast number of American undergraduate colleges, an acknowledged few cer- 
tainly stand out as “elite” institutions. These have contributed far more than 
their numeric share of leaders in various occupations. Yet the hold these insti- 
tutions have on the leadership in this country is less than comparable institu- 
tions have in some other countries. In Japan, for example, a third of presidents 
of large companies, over 60 percent of senior government officials, and virtu- 
ally all postwar prime ministers are graduates of Tokyo University, which pro- 
duces  only  about  1 percent  of  the  country’s  university  graduates  (Rohlen 
1983, 88, 91; Fallows  1990,  17-18).  In the United  States, the influence of 
elite institutions appears to be quite a bit less. Of the eight presidents  since 
1960, for example, only two, John Kennedy and George Bush, received bach- 
elor’s degrees from elite private institutions. 
But is the concentration of talented students in such colleges increasing in 
this country? Cook and Frank present evidence that it is. They show, for ex- 
ample, that  the percentage  of  a well-known  national  science competition’s 
finalists going to Harvard increased between the 1960s and the 1980s from 18 
to 22 percent,  and the percentage going to one of  the top seven colleges in- 
creased from 47 to 59 percent. Similarly, the odds that a top-scoring freshman 
at the University of California will attend the flagship Berkeley campus rose 
from 2.8 times the odds that any freshman would attend Berkeley in 1980 to 
14.7 times  the average  odds  in  1988. If  it is indicative of  a more general 
concentration of influence among the set of American colleges and universi- 
ties, this trend  would represent a moving away from a system that offers a 
relatively  large number of independent avenues to positions of power. In his 
comments, Malcolm Getz questions the definition of elite used by Cook and 
Frank, considers the possibility that the trends they uncover may be part of a 
very long-term change, and points out that there are still enough elite institu- 
tions to ensure some level of choice and competition among them. 
Because of their role in determining the quality of academic research and 
graduate  education, undergraduates  who  choose  academic  careers  are ob- 
viously an important input in the economics of higher education. We have a 
good idea of the numbers of undergraduates who enter graduate programs but 
lack good information on their quality. Using a unique data set composed of 
questionnaires completed by virtually all of the graduates of Harvard College 
from 1985 to 1990, Jerry Green asks whether the quality of college students 
who intend to become academics has been changing. Overall, he finds little 
evidence  of increased  or decreased  interest  in  academic careers during the 
period,  although  the  data for  1990 may  indicate  the beginning  of  a  trend 
toward academic careers. Among humanities majors, however, an increase in 
interest over the period is evident. Probably the most noticeable change in the 7  Introduction 
pattern  of  career choice over this period is a decline in interest in medicine 
and a corresponding increase in interest in life sciences. In her comment on 
Green’s paper,  Charlotte  Kuh presents  a comparison  of  the distribution  by 
field of Harvard  B.A.’s with the overall  distribution and concludes that the 
Harvard distribution is roughly representative. She draws attention to the de- 
cline in the percentage of high honors students selecting doctoral work in the 
physical  sciences as a potentially worrisome trend  among the findings pre- 
sented by Green. 
Another element  in determining  the flow of talented  students into Ph.D. 
programs is the amount of financial support available. The federal government 
has been a major source of such support, but this source has also been subject 
to fluctuation. Ehrenberg,  Rees, and Brewer examine the effect that changes 
in federally financed fellowships have had on universities.  Looking at the pat- 
tern  of  adjustments  made by  institutions  in  reaction  to changes  in  outside 
funding of graduate fellowships, they find that institutions tend to compensate 
for such changes by  substituting  internally  financed  fellowship support for 
federal funds. Although such response is quick, it is not one-for-one; on av- 
erage, institutions decrease their own funding so as to drop about one student 
for each four additional students supported by outside funds. Examining be- 
havior by field, the authors again find that this general story of internal fungi- 
bility applies in most areas. They caution, however, that institutions may re- 
direct or save internal funds in ways that may further mitigate the effects of 
changes  in  outside  support. In  his  discussion  of  the  paper,  Michael  Mc- 
Pherson notes that the subject of this research can be seen as a special case of 
the more general question of how outside funding affects the behavior of uni- 
versities. Do they view the funding as temporary and hoard it, or do they view 
it  as permanent  and adjust their long-run behavior accordingly? McPherson 
echoes the authors’ conclusion that answering such questions requires a fuller 
model of the university than we have at present. 
In his chapter,  Robert Merton focuses on an important topic that has re- 
ceived surprisingly little attention from economists: How should universities 
manage  their endowments?  Although  only  a few universities  have endow- 
ments ranking them in the billion-dollar club, some 67 universities  had en- 
dowments as large as $200 million  in  1990, and many  more had holdings 
whose income represents a significant share of their budgets. Merton begins 
with  the  standard model  of  portfolio  management.  Applying this  model  to 
universities requires care because university wealth includes much more than 
the financial assets in its portfolio.  Other major assets include such obvious 
ones as the institution’s land and physical plant as well as less easily measured 
ones, such as the future stream of expected gifts from alumni and other do- 
nors. Because of the variety of this asset mix, the principle of diversification 
that underlies the theory of optimal portfolio allocation cannot be applied only 
to financial assets; rather,  all assets must  be taken  into account.  Since it is 
relatively  easy to manage, the university’s endowment can be used to offset 8  Charles T. Clotfelter and Michael Rothschild 
changes in the larger set of  assets. It can be used, for example, as a hedge 
against anticipated changes in costs. If the local cost of housing affects faculty 
salaries,  an institution can hold  local real  estate in its portfolio  as a hedge 
against future  inflation.  This  approach  may  also have  implications for the 
kinds of financial assets a university holds. For example, a technical institu- 
tion,  many of whose alumni work in high-tech industries,  should probably 
invest less of its endowment in those industries, since contributions it receives 
in the future will most likely be positively correlated with the fortunes of those 
industries. 
In his comment on this paper, George Constantinides raises questions about 
the basic  assumption of  Merton’s model-that  the university  should, like a 
consumer, maximize a discounted sum of  future utility. Universities are not, 
Constantinides notes, individuals. Instead they are more like business firms- 
economic institutions which exist to serve individual needs.  Heterogeneous 
investors benefit by choosing from the diversified offerings of specialized in- 
vestment vehicles that  are harmed  if  firms force diversification  by  forming 
inefficient conglomerates.  In  the  same way,  Constantinides  argues,  society 
may  be  the  poorer  if  some  universities  diversify as Merton  suggests  they 
should. Constantinides’ comment also shows how Merton’s analysis, which 
uses the technology of continuous time stochastic processes  common to the 
finance literature, may be recast in more familiar terms. 
As  noted  above, one distinguishing  feature  of  the  American  system  of 
higher education is the coexistence of strong private and public sectors. The 
public  sector, consisting of  institutions operated by  state and local  govern- 
ments, is by far the larger, with public institutions enrolling more than two- 
thirds  of  all  four-year  college  students  and  virtually  all  two-year  college 
students.  For state governments,  higher  education is a major  function,  ac- 
counting for a fifth of  all direct expenditures. In the final chapter of the vol- 
ume, John  Quigley  and Daniel Rubinfeld  examine  the provision  of  public 
higher education by the states. Historically, they explain, public colleges and 
universities arose in the shadow of largely preexisting private institutions. In 
the East, where  private  colleges  were  established early,  public  institutions 
tend to be less important.  By contrast,  the public  sector is dominant in the 
newer states of the West and Midwest. One interesting fact consistent with the 
view that public and private institutions act as close substitutes is the finding 
that public and private tuitions in a state tend to be positively correlated. Not 
only does there appear to be  a trade-off between  states’ public  and private 
enrollments, but there is also an apparent trade-off between two-year and four- 
year colleges.  There  is substantial variation  among states in the  amount of 
public higher education provided  and also in the degree to which attendance 
is subsidized. Perhaps the biggest question concerning the public provision of 
higher education is why state governments do it at all. Quigley and Rubinfeld 
provide several alternative explanations,  including the possibility  that in this 
country higher education approaches the status of  secular religion, receiving 9  Introduction 
almost unquestioned support. In her comment on the paper, Helen Ladd draws 
attention  to the  heavy  hand  of  history  in determining the different  public- 
private splits observed by region, and she suggests alternative ways to model 
the public supply of  higher education. In the end, we are left with a number 
of unresolved puzzles,  among them why states differ in the degree to which 
they subsidize higher education, and particularly the education of out-of-state 
students. 
The purpose  of  this  volume is to bring  economic analysis  to bear upon 
issues affecting higher education. We believe that the importance of the stud- 
ies contained herein can be judged using more than one yardstick.  Not only 
do they reveal new empirical findings and provide methodological insights, 
they also raise questions for future research. They reveal ways in which our 
understanding  of supply and demand for higher education remains undevel- 
oped. More work needs to be done, for example, on the effects of tuition and 
financial aid programs on the level and composition  of demand for college. 
The labor market for academics, including the supply of women and minori- 
ties, remains inadequately  understood.  And the technology of production in 
the industry-in  both the teaching and the research aspects-continues  to be 
difficult to model, even for those who work there. We believe, however, that 
the studies presented  here represent  a useful step in the direction of  a fuller 
understanding of the workings of this important industry. 
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